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T T T T T
he weakening of the government’s fiscal posi-
tion in 2002 and in 2003 underscores more
than ever the urgency of arresting the unde-
terred contraction of the revenue effort of the
national government which has slipped since the onset
of the East Asian financial crisis from 19.4 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997 to 15.5 percent
of GDP in 2001 and 13.9 percent in 2000. Although other
countries in the region have likewise suffered a deterio-
ration in their revenue effort since 1997/1998, the de-
cline in these countries, with the exception of Malaysia,
has not been as severe as that in the Philippines (Table 1).
Although nontax revenues dipped as well, the erosion of
the revenue effort in the Philippines is largely due to the
weakening of the tax effort as in the other countries in
the region. Thus, overall tax effort in the Philippines plum-
meted by 3.5 percentage points from a peak of 17.0
percent of GDP in 1997 to 13.5 percent in 2001 (Figure
1). About two-thirds of the contraction (or 2.3 percent-
age points of GDP) is due to the reduction in Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) tax revenues while the remainder
(or 1.2 percentage points of GDP) is attributable to the
reduction in Bureau of Customs (BOC) revenues.
Collections for all the major tax groups fell relative to
GDP in 1997-2001. The biggest reductions were exhib-
ited by the import duties, excise taxes, and income taxes.
For instance, tariff revenues tumbled from 3.9 percent
of GDP in 1997 to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2001. Collec-
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Table 1. Revenue and tax effort in ASEAN countries,
1996-2000 (Percent of GDP)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total revenue
Indonesia 17.0 18.1 12.6 17.9 15.9
Malaysia 23.3 23.5 20.0 19.7 18.3
Thailand 19.5 18.6 16.2 16.2 16.5
Philippines 18.9 19.4 17.4 16.1 15.6
Tax revenues
Indonesia 14.7 16.5 11.8 16.6 14.5
Malaysia 19.4 19.8 16.7 16.0 14.3
Thailand 17.6 16.5 14.2 14.0 14.3
Philippines 16.9 17.0 15.6 14.5 13.92 December 2002
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tions from excise taxes shrank from 2.6 percent to 1.6
percent of GDP, revenues from taxes on income and prof-
its, from 6.8 percent to 6.1 percent of GDP while collec-
tions from value added and licenses, from 2.8 percent
to 2.4 percent of GDP during the same period (Figure 2).
While the slide in nontax revenues is largely explained by
the diminution in the income of the Bureau of Treasury
following the decline in domestic interest rates, the rea-
sons for the fall in tax revenues have been somewhat of
a puzzle to many analysts. On the one hand, many be-
lieve that the slump in tax effort reflects the lack of po-
litical will to tackle tax evasion. On the other hand, some
groups point out that changes in the structure of the
economy during the period (e.g., economic recovery be-
ing led by lightly taxed sectors like agriculture and ex-
ports) partly explain the degeneration of tax effort. Still
others note that some of the tax policy changes intro-
duced in 1996/1997 under the umbrella of the Compre-
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Figure 2. Tax-to-GDP ratio, selected taxes, 1990-2001
in loss of revenue that was not compensated adequately
by the expected revenue gains from provisions that were
not legislated and therefore not implemented.
Table 2 shows the varying importance of each of these
factors in explaining the decline in tax effort at the BIR
and BOC in 1997-2001.1 While the fall in BOC revenues
account for over three-quarters of the overall contraction
in tax effort between 1997 and 1998, BIR has since then
emerged to be the dominant source of the flagging tax
effort. The programmed reduction in tariff rates under
the trade liberalization program of the government ac-
counts for some 40-50 percent of the reduction in tax
effort at the BOC in 1998-1999. Changes in the compo-
sition of imports (i.e., the shift away from dutiable im-
ports) also adversely affected the BOC’s tax take in those
two years. A deterioration in the quality of customs ad-
ministration was evident in 1998 but not in 1999-2001.
Thus, almost all of the diminution in the BOC’s tax effort
in 2000 and 2001 was due to the lower tariff rates. On
the average, BOC tax effort dipped by 0.33 percentage
point of GDP every year between 1997 and 2001 due to
the planned reduction in tariff rates.
The negative impact on revenues of lower import tariffs
was compounded by weaknesses at the BIR which re-
sulted in huge tax leakages even prior to 1997.2 Higher
tax evasion (relative to 1997) accounted for 98 percent
__________
1In column 1 of Table 2, the change in the tax-to-GDP ratio for
each year in 1998-2001 is always measured relative to 1997. For each
of the major taxes, the contribution of the change in economic structure to
the decline in tax effort was derived by estimating the amount of tax
revenue that would have been collected if there were no changes in the
composition of the economy relative to 1997 (i.e., if the tax base-to-GDP
ratio was kept at the 1997 level). On the other hand, the contribution of
the change in tax policy to the deterioration of tax effort was computed by
estimating the amount of tax revenue that would have been collected if
the effective tax rates that were prevailing in 1997 were applied to the
current year’s tax base. Meanwhile, the contribution of higher tax evasion
was derived as a residual. That is, what cannot be explained by the first
two factors was attributed to increased tax evasion.
2The Department of Finance (1998) estimated the total tax leakage
in 1997 at 7.8 percent of GNP (with 7.2% of GDP due from the BIR and
0.6% of GNP due from the BOC).3 No. 2002-14
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and 54 percent of the reduction in BIR tax effort in 1998
and 1999. While some improvement in BIR tax adminis-
tration was evident in 2000 (relative to the 1999 level
but not relative to 1997), further weakening of the sys-
tem was registered in 2001. In that year, the VAT as well
as the tax on income and profits were the major sources
of evasion.
On the other hand, the contribution of changes in tax
policy to the collapse of BIR tax effort rose persistently
in 1998-2001. In particular, 46 percent of the 2.3 per-
centage point decline in BIR tax effort between 1997-
2001 was attributable to changes in tax policy (notably
the reduction in effective tax rates for the income tax
and the excise tax due to nonindexation), another 46
percent to increased evasion and only 7 percent to
changes in economic structure. On the average, BIR tax
effort declined by 0.26 percentage point of GDP every
year between 1997 and 2001 due to the changes in tax
structure brought about by the CTRP. It is also notable
Box 1. The 1996/1997 Comprehensive Tax Reform Package
In 1996-1997, the government launched another round of tax reform under the umbrella of the Comprehensive Tax Reform
Package. As originally designed, it was meant to (1) widen the tax base; (2) simplify the tax structure so as to minimize the tax
evasion; and (3) make the system more elastic and easier to administer. While intended initially to be legislated as a comprehen-
sive measure, it was actually passed into law in piecemeal fashion.
As a result, Republic Act (RA) 8184 which provided for the restructuring of the excise tax on petroleum products hand in hand
with tariff restructuring in the sector was enacted into law in June 1996. Meanwhile, RA 8240 which reverted the excise tax on
fermented liquor, distilled spirits and cigarettes back to the specific scheme from the ad valorem system took effect on January
1, 1997. On the other hand, RA 8241 (which also took effect on January 1, 1997) expanded the list of items that are exempted
under the expanded value added tax (EVAT) to include printing, publication, importation or sale of books, newspapers, maga-
zines, reviews or bulletins; operators of taxicabs, rent-a-car companies; operators of tourist buses; small radio and television
broadcasting franchise grantees; sale of properties used for low-cost and socialized housing; and the lease of residential units
with a monthly rental not exceeding P8,000 per month. Lastly, RA 8424 (otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997) was
passed by Congress in 1997. It provided for (1) the phased reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 35 percent in 1997
to 32 percent from 2000 onwards; (2) the levy of a 2 percent minimum corporate income tax rate; (3) the adoption of the net
operating loss carry forward (NOLCO); (4) accelerated depreciation using double declining balance or sum-of-the-years digits
method; (5) cap on deductibility of travel and entertainment expense; (6) disallowance of the tax benefits of interest arbitrage;
(7) introduction of a tax on fringe benefits; (8) reimposition of the final withholding tax on dividends although intercorporate
dividends remain exempt; (9) levy of a final withholding tax of 7.5 percent on interest earned by residents on foreign currency
deposits; (10) increase in the level of personal exemptions for the individual income tax; and (11) gradual reduction of the top
marginal tax rate for the individual income tax from 35 percent in 1997 to 32 percent in 2000 onwards.
It should be emphasized that the various bills adopted by Congress deleted key proposed features of the tax reform package. In
consequence, the overall impact of the Package on the revenue performance of the tax system has been negative. On the one
hand, the broader coverage of the VAT under the expanded VAT (i.e., EVAT) improved VAT effort (albeit to a lesser degree than
projected by government), with revenues from the VAT and selected tax on services (like other percentage taxes, tax on insur-
ance premiums and franchise tax) rising from 2.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 2.4 percent of GDP in 1997. On the other hand,
while the adoption of specific rates for excise taxes was meant to guard against evasion, the move reduced the buoyancy of the
tax system because the indexation provision that was part of the original proposal was not approved by Congress. In like manner,
although the rationalization of fiscal incentives was an integral part of the Package when it was first conceived, the proposal has
not been passed in Congress even as the key departments (Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, National
Economic and Development Authority, and Department of Budget and Management) continue to debate the design and coverage
of tax incentive regimes.
Meanwhile, the provisions of RA 8424 relating to the corporate income tax were estimated to increase revenues. Not all of the
expected gains in revenue, however, were realized on time because of the delays in the issuance of the regulations needed to
implement said provisions. On the other hand, the revenue losses arising from the increase in personal exemptions for individual
income tax payers were felt immediately.4 December 2002
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that, on the whole, the reduction in
tax effort brought about by modifi-
cations in tax policy (specifically
those due to the nonindexation of
excise taxes) is not a one-time re-
duction but has been growing over
time.
In sum, Table 2 suggests that tax
evasion continues to be a major
source of the leakage in revenues
and that the situation appears to
have worsened in 2001. However,
it also indicates that weaknesses
in tax structure (nonindexation of
excise taxes and the lower effec-
tive income tax rates without com-
pensating changes in other taxes)
likewise contributed significantly to
the decline in tax effort.
What can be done? Given this per-
spective, two pieces of legislation
are urgently needed.
One is a need to amend RA 8240
so as to allow for the indexation of
the excise taxes on tobacco and al-
coholic products. While the fiscal
authorities talk about the “restruc-
turing of the excise taxes on dis-
tilled spirits and the indexation of
the tax rates two years thereafter by the amount of cu-
mulative inflation” in the Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF), it is not clear if such index-
ation is intended to apply to excise taxes on fermented
liquor and cigarettes.3 Moreover, the BESF is silent on
the indexation of excise tax on petroleum products.
And two is a need to revisit proposals for the rationaliza-
tion of fiscal incentives (Box 2). These proposals call for
a shorter list of activities that would qualify for invest-
ment incentives and the adoption of an operative budget
for tax expenditures pertaining to fiscal incentives. In ad-
dition, the BESF is also calling for the lifting of the present
exemption of Asian utility vehicles from the excise tax on
automobiles. Given the proximity of the 2004 election,
moving these new tax measures through the legislative
mill in their undiluted form will be a major challenge to
__________
3With respect to alcoholic and tobacco products, the BESF only talks
about the reclassification of products based on their current net retail
price.
1998 1999
Economic Tax Increased Total Economic Tax Increased Total
Structure Policy Evasion Structure Policy Evasion
BIR 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.5
% contribution -84.4 85.9 98.4 100.0 16.0 30.4 53.6 100.0
Value added tax 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
Tax on income
and profits 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
Excise taxes -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5
Other domestic
taxes 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
BOC -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -1.0
% contribution 28.6 39.0 32.4 100.0 47.0 49.0 4.0 100.0
Tax revenues 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.4 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -2.5
% 2.2 50.0 47.8 100.0 28.4 37.8 33.8 100.0
Table 2. Explaining the decline in tax efforta
2000 2001
Economic Tax Increased Total Economic Tax Increased Total
Structure Policy Evasion Structure Policy Evasion
BIR -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -2.1 -0.2 -1.1 -1.1 -2.3
% contribution 38.8 40.8 20.4 100.0 7.3 46.5 46.2 100.0
Value added tax 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
Tax on income
and profit -0.7 -0.2 0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6
Excise taxes -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 -1.0
Other domestic
taxes -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
BOC 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 -1.3  0.1 -1.3
% contribution 3.9 98.1 -1.9 100.0 4.8 106.3 -11.1 100.0
Tax revenues -0.8 -1.9 -0.4 -3.1 -0.2 -2.4 -0.9 -3.6
% 27.2 59.9 12.9 100.0 6.4 67.7 25.9 100.0
aChange in tax effort relative to 1997, measured as percent of GDP.5 No. 2002-14
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Box 2: Fiscal incentives
At present, there are some 150 laws that provide tax incentives to various industries and special interest groups. These are
mainly in the form of tax credits and exemptions that have narrowed the tax base and increased the opportunities for tax
avoidance, primarily because of the wider scope for discretion in the administration of the incentive system.
Fiscal incentives are wide ranging across activities and sectors and extend to various taxes. The most important of these are
those that provide income tax holiday and exemption from import duties to selected industries through the Board of Investments
(under the 1987 Revised Omnibus Investment Code) and to locators in special economic zones through the Philippine Export
Zone Authority (PEZA). For example, export enterprises are exempted from customs duties and sales taxes on inputs and
receive additional deductions for labor costs and tax credits for using domestic raw materials. Further incentives are granted to
“pioneer” industries which introduce new products, use labor-intensive processes or produce more than 50 percent for export. In
addition, a variety of fiscal exemptions are extended to the agricultural sector.
Although numerous studies conclude that tax incentives are not a major determinant of investment location decisions of firms,
analysts and policymakers agree that foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a critical role in the growth prospects of the country.
Consequently, in more recent years, the focus of fiscal incentives has shifted from “attracting investment to selected sectors” to
simply “attracting investments” in the context of a highly competitive regional environment for FDI (Medalla 2002).
Studies have also raised various concerns with the Philippine fiscal incentives regime, namely: (1) high fiscal cost in terms of
foregone revenues estimated to be equal to 1-2 percent of GDP1 (Box Table 1); (2) ineffectiveness in promoting investments
because of the reliance on nonperformance-based incentives; (3) distortionary impact on the economy; (4) too wide coverage of
the investment priorities list; and (5) duplication of incentives from various special laws (World Bank 2000). The rationalization
of fiscal incentives and tax exemptions was thus an integral part of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package in line with the
reduction in the corporate tax rate and the introduction of the NOLCO and accelerated depreciation in Tax Code. However, the
bill that was originally proposed under the Tax Reform Package was not acted upon by Congress. To date, even the executive
branch appears to have ambivalent views on fiscal incentives. In fact, the President’s Budget for 2003 is silent about fiscal
incentives.
1The numbers shown in Box Table 1 do not include revenue foregone from the exemption of inputs to exports from taxes and duties as part of
the free trade regime given to exports.
Box Table 1. Summary of revenues waived from various
fiscal incentives provisions, 1998-2000 (in billion pesos)
Statutory basis 1998 1999 2000
Tax- and duty-exempt imports under various laws 38.2 30.6 9.6
BOI-approved incentives 11.6 6.2 3.9
Tax credits - 0.6 0.8
Subsidy availment through E.O. 93 - 3.4 2.6
Subsidy availment through the GAA - 1.7 12.2
Conditionally-free importation under Section 10 0.8 0.6 0.5
of the Tariff and Customs Code
Economic zones incentives - 0.7 3.7
Exemption from internal revenue taxes
under various laws - - 4.6
Total 50.6 43.8 37.9
Percent of GDP 1.9 1.5 1.16 December 2002
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both Congress and the executive branch inasmuch as
raising taxes will undeniably hurt certain sectors.
In the near term, however, a price survey of tobacco and
alcoholic products should be conducted immediately to
permit the reclassification of said products for excise tax
purposes. Such a survey is prescribed in RA 8240 but
has not been implemented to date. This move will pro-
vide temporary relief to the unmitigated erosion of rev-
enues from excise taxes pending the legislative action
on indexation.
At the same time, efforts to strengthen tax administra-
tion should be pursued even more vigorously. In particu-
lar, the administration of the VAT has been shown to be a
big source of the higher tax leakage in 1998-2001 (Table
2). In principle, VAT evasion may arise from two sources:
(1) the underdeclaration of sales; and/or (2) the
overdeclaration of claims for input VAT. The BIR has re-
cently launched a program that is meant to flush out firms
which underdeclare their sales. Prospectively, the Bureau
could also minimize the leakage from the overdeclaration
of claims for input VAT through the use of industry
benchmarking. In this regard, it is notable that some 45
percent of the large VAT payers were found to have ex-
ceeded their respective industry benchmark (for the ra-
tio of the value of VAT-able inputs to value of VAT-able
output) by more than 50 percent (Manasan 2002).
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On a more general note, the computerization of the BIR
has to be strengthened further. Better use of informa-
tion technology will clearly go a long way in plugging leak-
ages in the tax system as it provides the BIR with in-
creased access to internal as well as external sources of
information and makes way for greater automation and
less discretion on the part of BIR examiners.      
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